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Allocating Scarce Water Resources:Examining if Price Differentials Exist in
a Prior Appropriations Setting
Abstract
This study examines the potential for a water leasing market within one singular basin in Southwestern, New
Mexico. The goal of this research is to test the feasibility of a water market in the river basin and determine if
price differentials are found in a prior appropriations setting. This was done through a laboratory experiment
to test if participants would simulate an effective water leasing market in a basin within New Mexico. In order
to assess the potential for a water leasing market, a water leasing market was designed to incorporate the
hydrologic, engineering, institutional, and economic market of the Upper Mimbres Basin (Broadbent et. al.,
2009). Using experimental economics, which uses computer programs and simulation to test an economic
theory, the market value of water was induced through the set up of the experiment. The set up involved
double auction where all bids and offers are presented publically and each bid and offer is presented
simultaneously. The advantages of conducting a laboratory experiment is predominantly time, data that would
usually take a year to collect can be done in a short amount of time. By simulating the water leasing market we
can test participants’ reactions to drought conditions, which could take years to occur in the real setting of
New Mexico.
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water rights amongst senior users and juniors, those with 
secondary claims on the water source, during times of 
drought has been proposed. Water leasing, also known 
as water banking, provides a temporary transfer of water 
rights, which could provide a market for smaller water 
users who need to buy water for irrigation purposes in 
times of drought. One possible problem could arise in a 
water market under a prior appropriations setting. As a 
result, the price differentials occur where higher prices 
are paid for “senior” water rights vs. “junior” water rights 
as defined by Libecap (2005).
In cases of water scarcity, consideration for a 
water market is necessary especially if the watershed 
is over allocated. This is supported at the state and 
national level. On the national level, the Department of 
the Interior (2005) discussed the issue of water scarcity 
in their report entitled Water 2025: Preventing Crises 
and Conflict in the West. Many states have drafted 
plans to address issues in water management. These 
state level water plans have been drafted by: California, 
New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. (California 
Department of Water Resources, 2012; New Mexico 
Office of the State Engineer, 2009; State of Nevada 
Division of Water Resources, 2011; Utah Division of 
Water Resources, 2001; Wyoming Water Development 
Office, 2007). The water scarce region of the western 
United States has consistently increased its demand for 
water despite limited water supplies. This points to a 
need for improved water allocation mechanisms, such 
as water leasing markets.
The inefficiencies of water allocation can be 
addressed through two market institutions: permanent 
water rights transfer or the leasing of water rights. 
Permanent transfer of water rights is an established 
practice in the west. Los Angeles would not exist today 
without the purchase and transfer of water rights from 
the Owens Valley. Water leasing markets, on the other 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Southwestern United States is an arid 
region with significantly low levels of precipitation. This 
region not only has a limited water supply, but also 
consequently has a large percentage of population 
growth. From 1965 to 2000 population has increased 
by 80 percent (Konieczki and Heilman, 2004). With the 
population increasing from year to year, as a result, there 
has also been an increase in the demand for water. This 
is seen in the withdrawal rate of water for domestic 
use, which has increased by 64 percent (Konieczki and 
Heilman, 2004).  While a growing population increases 
the demand for water use among humans, a majority 
of the water supply still goes towards irrigation for 
agriculture. The demand for water is not the only 
increasing factor, but temperatures over the last century 
have increased 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit around the globe 
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). 
The warming climate has impacted, for example, the 
natural flow of the Colorado River, which supplies water 
to a large portion of the arid Southwestern region of the 
United States (United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2012). Future prospective droughts due to 
climate change and an increasing population have the 
potential to create conflicts over water supplies, which 
is amplified by the nature of the water rights in the 
Southwest.   
The water right laws in the Southwest differ 
from the rest of the country (i.e. riparian rights). In the 
western United States the predominant water law is 
known as the Doctrine of Prior Appropriations. This law 
was a response to the arid climate and has been in 
existence since the settlement of the west. The concept 
of prior appropriations states that water can be set aside 
for “beneficial use”, which is an ambiguous term (Fort, 
2002).  Prior appropriations give senior users the first 
claim to the water in the times of a drought. A drought 
is commonly referred to as a call. Therefore, leasing of 
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hand, are a newly emerging market institution. Water 
leasing provides a temporary transfer of water rights, 
which would provide a market for smaller water users 
who need water for irrigation purposes (Shupe et. al., 
1989).  
This study examines the potential for a 
water leasing market within one singular basin in 
Southwestern, New Mexico. The goal of this research 
is to test the feasibility of a water market in the river 
basin and determine if price differentials are found in 
a prior appropriations setting. This was done through 
a laboratory experiment to test if participants would 
simulate an effective water leasing market in a basin 
within New Mexico. In order to assess the potential 
for a water leasing market, a water leasing market was 
designed to incorporate the hydrologic, engineering, 
institutional, and economic market of the Upper Mimbres 
Basin (Broadbent et. al., 2009). Using experimental 
economics, which uses computer programs and 
simulation to test an economic theory, the market 
value of water was induced through the set up of the 
experiment. The set up involved double auction where 
all bids and offers are presented publicly and each bid 
and offer is presented simultaneously. The advantages of 
conducting a laboratory experiment is predominantly 
time, data that would usually take a year to collect can 
be done in a short amount of time. By simulating the 
water leasing market we can test participants’ reactions 
to drought conditions, which could take years to occur 
in the real setting of New Mexico. 
The data from two trials (each simulating a 
year’s worth of transactions) were studied. From these 
experiments, individual transactions are recorded 
including the stakeholders involved in the trade, the 
quantity of water traded, price of water traded and 
the impacts on the hydrologic model. It is, therefore, 
hypothesized that stakeholders will fulfill their assigned 
roles under the experimental leasing system (the market 
price will be equal to the expected market price) and 
there will be a price differential between senior and 
junior user’s water rights during times of a call. The 
focus of this research is firstly is to test whether the 
experimental market follows realistic expectations and 
secondly to examine the benefits of instituting a water 
leasing market within the river basin. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Broadbent et al. (2009) summarize the 
literature on water leasing markets. Their article 
establishes the need for water leasing markets in the 
west, the barriers to establishing water leasing markets, 
and past theoretical and empirical studies on water 
leasing markets.
Permanent transfer of water rights, have been 
studied for almost forty years. Literature regarding 
permanent transfer of water rights has outlined criteria 
essential for successful water market transactions. 
Broadbent et al. (2009) outline the criteria as “1) well-
defined, securable, and tradable property rights; 2) 
hydrologic and engineering reality; 3) environmental 
quality; 4) social/community and traditional uses; 5) 
transaction costs; and 6) third-party effects” (p. 713). 
Third party effects are resolved through the adoption of 
the “no-injury” rule, transactions that economically harm 
third parties cannot occur. Typically, transaction costs 
are higher in water markets and therefore addressing 
third party effects is necessary to create a successful 
water leasing market. Water markets must acknowledge 
traditional water uses such as Native American rights 
to water as well as the environmental impacts of water 
leasing on the watershed. Understanding the hydrologic 
and engineering reality of a watershed will not only 
determine the feasibility of trading water in specific 
locations but also address the impacts on the watershed. 
Above all, well-defined property rights encourage right 
holders’ to act in their own self-interest.
Theoretical studies on water leasing markets 
have acknowledged it as “an attractive option for 
both parties because it maintains continuity, preserves 
ownership by holder of the right for future use, and 
accommodates an intermediate use” (Shupe et al. 
1989). Empirical studies have been conducted in the 
Western United States (Yoskowitz, 1999; Czetwertynski, 
2002; Yoskowitz, 2002; Loomis et.al., 2003; Adams et. al., 
2004; Howitt, 2005; Brown, 2006; Brewer et.al., 2007), 
as well as southeastern Australia (Crase et.al, 2000; 
Bjornlund, 2003, 2004; Crase, et. al., 2004; Turra et. al., 
2005), and Southern Chile (Hadjigeorgalis, 2004). These 
studies show that water leasing has received national 
and international attention. Studying the literature on 
water leasing markets establishes a basis to study water-
leasing markets.  
A recent article by Basta and Colby (2010) 
examine the trends of water markets for leasing and 
permanent transfers. Basta and Colby expand the 
literature on water markets through the compilation 
of the monthly water transactions reported from 1987 
to 2007 in the journal Water Strategist. From this they 
establish a large dataset of many states and regional 
water markets. Through the analysis of water sales 
Harroun
The Park Place Economist, Volume XXI60
data, Basta and Colby ascertain trends in the water 
market. Trends, such as total transactions, total quantity 
traded, and average prices, aid in the understanding 
in the valuation of water rights and the water market 
itself. Almost all states and regions observed a general 
trend of an increasing number of transactions in the 
sale and lease of water rights, whereas New Mexico is 
experiencing a growing leasing market instead of the 
permanent sale of water rights. Leasing is a growing 
market within California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, 
and the Pacific Northwest Region. Prices are rising, with 
a variance in prices between regions. This supports the 
concept of the increased strain on the water supply, 
especially in the Western United States. It also signifies 
the importance to understand trends in the burgeoning 
water market.
Watson and Davies (2011) examine regional 
growth in the South Platte River Basin in Colorado to 
understand the incentive structures for different users 
if the water supply is fixed (2011). They examine the 
demand of both agricultural and municipal water users, 
finding that with an increasing population will strain the 
water supplies and force water to be used for urban 
user rather than irrigation. In addition, return flows from 
municipal to agricultural users provide more water 
for irrigation. Finally, they found the price of municipal 
water to increase by 25 percent where the agricultural 
price for water remained the same. This is likely due 
to the increasing population within the region, which 
subsequently increases the municipalities demand 
for water ; whereas, the demand from the agricultural 
sector remains largely the same.
Yoskowitz (2001) looks at existing price 
differentials in water market transactions in the Rio 
Grande Valley in Texas. In order to understand this 
phenomenon the article addresses the institutional 
nature of the water markets. This is done by statistics 
to show price differentials converging and diverging 
over time among agricultural users and urban users. 
In addition, Yoskowitz hypothesizes possible reasons 
why price differentials occur. The results support a 
differential price among different water users, and price 
convergence has yet to occur. Yoskowitz (2001) attributes 
price differentials to asymmetries in information and 
the price elasticity of different water users. Yoskowitz 
(2001) looks at price differentials between consumers 
and represents the empirical model used to test if price 
differentials occur.
A. Summary of Literature
 There are many challenges facing the current 
water leasing markets. Broadbent et al. (2009) outlined 
requirements necessary to ensure water-leasing markets 
are efficient. These included well-defined water rights, 
markets based upon hydrologic and engineering reality, 
markets that protect environmental quality, community 
and traditional uses, acknowledge transactions costs, 
and address third-party effects. Basta and Colby (2010) 
survey the current trends of water markets in the 
Western United States and find a general increase in 
the number of transactions of water rights through both 
leasing and sales. While there have been many studies 
done examining water leasing markets in the Western 
United States (Yoskowitz 1999; Czetwertynski, 2002; 
Yoskowitz, 2002; Loomis et al., 2003; Adams et al., 2004; 
Howitt, 2005; Brown, 2006; Brewer et. al., 2007), very 
few have examined the occurrence of price differentials 
(Yoskowitz, 2001; Watson, 2011).  These studies have 
found price differentials occurring between agricultural 
users and urban users.
III. THEORY 
 The design of the hypothetical water leasing 
market draws upon experimental economics. 
Experimental economics uses laboratory techniques 
to test an economic theory. Essentially, experimental 
economics induces values through the use of 
participants to test a hypothesis. The data for this paper 
was collected through a double auction experiment. 
A double auction means that all bids and offers are 
presented publicly and each bid and offer is presented 
simultaneously.
 Basic supply and demand theory is the 
conceptual framework where the demand function is a 
step demand function (Smith, 1982). The step demand 
function occurs due to a differing market price value 
between irrigators and municipalities. The flat region of 
the demand curve in Figure 1 refers to the irrigators 
demand for water. The marginal utility for municipalities 
is higher than irrigators and therefore the left flat 
region on the demand curve represents municipalities 
demand for water (See Figure 1). Municipalities value 
water rights at a higher price than irrigators because 
there are a fixed number of water rights based upon 
the hydrology of the basin and the supply of water is 
perfectly inelastic. Users are not able to draw more 
than their allotment of water, even when flows are high. 
In times of a call the supply moves left and water prices 
rise (See Figure 1).  Water is only supplied to senior 
users during a drought. Senior users are those with the 
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oldest claim to the water. Junior users are those with 
newer claims to the water and are the first to have their 
water cut off during times of a drought. Therefore junior 
users as well as the municipalities’ willingness to pay for 
these rights will increase in times of drought. 
Based upon the step demand function, during 
times of a drought a price differential will occur between 
senior and junior users if prices depend upon the users’ 
willingness to pay. Price differentials occur as a result 
of differing marginal values between users. According 
to Libecap (2005) price differentials still exist within 
the water leasing market because of the infrequency 
of trades. Libecap states, “Water trades take place and 
are growing in frequency and magnitude, but they are 
not sufficient to cause water prices to equalize on the 
margin, adjusting for transport costs” (p. 39).  Water 
markets still face heavy regulations on the transfer of 
water rights due to the interconnectedness of water 
uses (Libecap, 2005).
IV. DATA
 The data for this study comes from an 
experimental water leasing market that was designed 
for the Upper Mimbres Basin in southwestern New 
Mexico. The two treatments used in this paper 
to understand the impacts of a call under a prior 
appropriations setting. The data collected from each 
experiment measures a full years worth of transactions. 
Conducting an experiment to test the feasibility of a 
water leasing market was chosen primarily because of 
a lack of data for the region. This data is appropriate 
to measure the hypothesis because the experiment 
induced values in which stakeholders first learned 
about the subject matter and had a monetary incentive 
to act in their best interest. In the Upper Mimbres Basin 
there are eleven stakeholders.
The oldest priority date is 1869, which has a 
yearly allocation of 789 acre-feet of water. This is the 
senior user who has the most favorable water rights 
during periods of drought, since they will be the last 
to get their water cut off. There are four users with 
the priority date of 1870 with an average allotment of 
18 acre-feet of water. Following the four users of 1870, 
there is one user with a priority date of 1880 with a 
yearly allocation of 99 acre-feet. Then there is one user 
with an 1893 priority date with a yearly allocation of 
132 acre feet and two users with an 1894 priority date 
with an average of 117 acre feet of water. The previously 
mentioned users are currently using their water for 
irrigation purchases but there are two municipalities 
in the region interested in leasing water rights. The 
water leasing market allows users to trade water each 
month to address inefficiencies in the current water 
allocation. Each trading round, which represents one 
trading round, users are able to buy or sell water to 
other users since this experiment is a double auction 
and all prices posted to buy and sell water are visible to 
all users. These trading decisions are then applied to the 
hydrologic model, which factors in the affects on water 
flow within the basin. Each month individual transactions 
are recorded including the stakeholders involved in 
the trade, the quantity of water traded, price of water 
traded and the impacts on the hydrologic model.
    
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
 In this study, two T-tests are done to measure 
whether there is a statistical difference between the 
following groups. Firstly, to investigate whether the 
data collected reflects the expected market price. 
Market price is determined through the experiment in 
each round of trading. For each round of trading the 
average price per quantity of water or market price was 
determined. Expected price is the price per quantity 
of water that should be elicited from the trading 
rounds given the unique payout of each participant. The 
expected market price was three dollars per acre-foot 
of water as shown in Figure 1; the null hypothesis was 
that market prices would not be equivalent to expected 
prices. To test whether market prices were equivalent 
to three dollars the following T-test was done.  
Secondly, the study determines if a price 
differential between senior and junior users during 
times of a drought exists. Senior users’ price per 
quantity of water should be higher than junior users in 
times of a drought. To accomplish this, the average price 
per quantity of the senior user’s water (1869 priority 
date) in each round was compared to the price per 
quantity of all other users (all other priority dates). 
Both experiments were aggregated in an effort to 
increase the sample size. The null hypothesis is: price is 
not dependent upon priority date. The following T-test 
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was done to see if there was a statistical significance 
between priority dates.
V. RESULTS
 The results proceed in four sections. First, 
results are presented that compare the expected price 
with the market price. Secondly, price differentials allow 
for the comparison between priority dates. Thirdly, 
the total number of transactions and, fourthly, the 
call results of both experiments. These are necessary 
comparisons when looking at the feasibility of a water 
leasing market for any basin operating under the setting 
of prior appropriations.
A. Market Prices
Descriptive statistics were used on the 
experimental data to determine the average price per 
acre-foot sold in every trading month (See Table 1). 
As well as each priority dates average price per acre-
foot (See Table 1). A T-test calculated to see whether 
market prices were equivalent to the expected market 
price of three dollars per acre-foot. Overall both 
experiments found the market prices were equivalent 
to the expected market price, except in times of a 
call (See Table 1 and 2). Rejecting the null in times of 
drought could be an indicator that price differentials 
exist. In the first few months of both experiments the 
null hypothesis can be accepted this is likely due to the 
fact that users were adjusting to the market as well as 
preemptively purchasing water in case of a call. This 
means that participants for the most part did take on 
their assigned role.
B. Price Differentials
 The results of the first T-test indicate the 
potential for price differentials. To determine whether 
price differentials occur between the oldest priority date 
and the rest of the priority dates, a second T-test was 
performed. The T-test found that there was a statistical 
difference between priority dates (See Table 4) and 
that there was a lag in price differentials during times 
of a drought. The high prices for the oldest priority date 
occurred in the month following the beginning of the 
drought and remained high the month after the drought 
ended. The small sample size did affect the ability to 
test certain months, even with the aggregation of data 
between the two experiments (See Table 3).
 C. Total Number of Transactions
The total number of transactions in both 
experiment one and two is displayed in Table 3. Table 
3 illustrates how minute the water leasing market 
is within the Upper Mimbres Basin, New Mexico. In 
some rounds, there were only one or two transactions. 
The small sample statistics indicate that an alternative 
method may be needed to further test the hypothesis. 
This can be done using a Willcoxon rank sum test.
D. Call Results
For both experiments, one and two, the 
expected drought given the hydrologic model is seen in 
Table 2. Without a water leasing market, the drought was 
expected to occur in the months of July and August. The 
drought in July would affect 1880, 1893, 1894, and in 
August it would affect 1994 users. In both experiments 
there is a decline in the severity and longevity of the 
drought (See Table 2).  In experiment one the drought 
occurred in July and August and affected 1894 users 
and the drought in experiment one occurred in July and 
affected 1894 users. These results show that the water 
leasing market allowed the participants to minimize the 
impacts of a call and therefore trading was beneficial.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Increased populations are adding pressure on 
the already scarce water resources of the Western 
United States. Establishing water-leasing markets within 
basins that are well established in the hydrological 
and engineering reality have the potential to increase 
efficiencies. Through this experimental market, which 
was modeled after an actual basin in New Mexico, the 
benefits of water leasing can be seen. However, this 
experiment data does reflect the expected outcome 
of a water leasing market in terms of average price per 
quantity of water.
In this study market prices overall were 
equivalent to expected prices, with the exception of 
months when there was a drought. Price differentials 
between the oldest priority dates and the rest of the 
priority dates do occur. Price differentials are a limiting 
factor in implementing a water leasing market. Water is 
not homogenous and thus price differentials might slow 
the transaction process down and result in less water 
allowed to the market, which in turn results in increased 
prices and making the market less efficient. The results 
of this study support results of previous studies 
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(Yoskowitz, 2001; Libecap, 2005; Watson, 2011) of which 
found price differentials between agricultural users and 
urban users. Libecap (2005) explains “the persistence 
of large price differentials between agricultural, urban, 
and environmental users reflects the lack of extensive, 
routine market trades that would otherwise arbitrage 
to narrow the differences” (p. 4). Promoting widespread 
use of water leasing markets should help eliminate price 
differentials between users.
This study had very few transactions in certain 
trading rounds. The thin market impacted the ability 
to calculate a significance level as well as to compare 
between priority dates. This led to an aggregation of 
both experiments in order to test whether price 
differentials occur between junior and senior users. 
A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test eliminates the concern 
for a small sample size because it is a nonparametric 
distribution free test. This would be an ideal way to 
extend this study. 
Establishing a water leasing market within this 
particular basin has shown environmentally beneficial. 
Due to the nature of the experiments, both trials had the 
same expected outcome in terms of a drought. In both 
experiments the length and severity of the expected 
drought was reduced due to the reallocation of water 
from the leasing of water. This displays the potential for 
water leasing markets to reallocate resources in a more 
efficient manner in regions where the Doctrine of Prior 
Appropriations is the predominant water law.
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Table 1: Weighted Average Market Prices
Trading 
Month
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
Experiment 1
Market 
Price
3.89** 3.91* 2.59+ 4.5+ 4 4.71** 5.5** 5.33* 3.71* 3.61 5+ 0
-1.06 -0.89 -0.65 0 -1 -1.29 -1.15 -0.88 -0.25 -0.67 0 0
1894 2 3 2 0 0 0 0 4.333 3.5 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1893 3.5 2.5 3.4 0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0 0
-0.7 0 -0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1880 4.29 3.5 3.5 0 3 4 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 5 3 0 0 4 7 6 0 0 0 5 0
0 -1.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 4 4.43 0 4.5 0 5.4 6 5.83 3.6 3.56 0 0
0 -0.12 0 0 0 -0.71 0 -0.23 -0.12 -0.75 0 0
Experiment 2
Market 
Price
4.63* 3.9* 3.59* 3.5++ 3.17 3.61* 2.6+ 2.8+ 3++ 3.33 0 0
-0.82 -0.2 -0.27 0 -0.25 -0.32 -0.3 -0.19 0 -0.35 0 0
1984 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.5 0 0 2.4 2.75 3 0 0 0
0 0 -0.3 0 0 0 -0.07 -0.23 0 0 0 0
Figure 1: Step Demand Function
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Table 1: Weighted Average Market Prices
1893 4.5 4 3.5 3.5 3 3.33 3 3 3 3.33 0 0
-0.71 0 0 0 0 -0.47 0 0 0 -0.35 0 0
1880 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 5.5 0 0 0 0 3.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
-0.71 0 0 0 0 -0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 4 4 0 0 3.5 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 -0.47 0 0 0 0 0 0
 *Denotes 0.05          +Denotes only one transaction
**Denotes 0.10      ++ More than one transaction, no standard error
Table 2: Expect Versus Actual Affects of Drought
Year Expected Affects of Drought
June July August
1869
1870
1880 X
1893 X
1894 X X
Drought in Experiment 1
1869
1870
1880
1893
1894 X X
Drought in Experiment 2
1869
1870
1880
1893
1894 X
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Table 3: Total Number of Trades
Trading Month
Scenario Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
No Stack/
Call #1
6 7 5 1 3 4 3 3 7 5 1 0
1894 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1893 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 0 0
1880 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1870 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1869 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 2 2 4 0 0
No Stack/
Call #2
8 6 6 2 4 6 5 3 3 2 0 0
1894 1 2 5 1 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 0
1893 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 1 2 2 0 0
1880 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1870 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1869 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Weighted Average Price by Priority Dates
Trading Month
Weighted 
Avg. Price
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
1869
Priority
4 4.25* 0 4.5* 3.5+ 4.86 6* 5.83* 3.6 3.56 0 0
0 -0.236 0 0 0 -1.258 0 -0.236 -0.118 -0.74 0 0
All Other 
Priorities
4.35 3.71 3.09 3.5 3.5 3.88 3 3.38 3.58 3.6 5 0
-1.047 -0.744 -0.499 0 -0.837 -1.315 -1.252 -0.739 -0.496 -0.5 0 0
Transactions by Priority Date
1869 2 5 0 1 1 3 1 2 2 4 0 0
All Other 
Priorities
12 9 10 2 6 7 8 4 8 3 1 0
* Denotes 0.05 significance + Denotes only one transaction
** Denotes 0.10 significance
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